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Over recent years, the budgetary policies carried out by Western countries during the
Post-War period have been analysed extensively in the literature. Several studies have
pointed to the interaction of economic and political factors and underlined the important
role of institutions and procedures in shaping policies and outcomes
1. Considerable
attention has been devoted to budgetary consolidation processes, with some studies
emphasising the role of the composition of budgetary measures in determining the
success of these policies
2.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse budgetary policies carried out during and after
severe recessions, an issue which the above-mentioned literature has not yet focused
upon.
Since the agreement on the “Stability and Growth Pact” by the European Council in
Dublin in December 1996, interest in this issue has increased significantly. The Stability
and Growth Pact, which sets the rules for budgetary behaviour in stage three of EMU,
singles out severe recessions as specifically problematical periods during which a certain
budgetary flexibility could be allowed.
The rules laid out in the Stability and Growth Pact are used in this paper as a benchmark
to evaluate past budgetary behaviour during recessions in the fifteen European Union
Member States. More specifically, the paper provides elements to examine the following
issues: what type of budgetary policies have been adopted during severe recessions in the
past? Were the automatic stabilisers allowed to operate fully and did governments adopt
an expansionary budgetary policy stance? Which factors influenced the policies
undertaken and what was the composition of the measures adopted? Can the
accumulation of debt, which took place in the past two decades in Europe, be explained
by ‘tax smoothing’ during periods of economic hardship?
With specific reference to the Stability and Growth Pact, the paper addresses the
following issues: which changes should be envisaged in national budgetary policies
during recessions in order to comply with the requirements of the Pact? More
specifically, what is the scope for discretionary counter-cyclical policies? What changes
are required in the policies implemented in post-recession periods? Which situations
might be particularly problematic? What risks are involved in the transition towards the
medium-term targets of close-to-balance or in surplus set by the Pact, and which types of
recession can lead Member States into a position of excessive deficit, even when they
start from a sound pre-recession budgetary position?
                                                          
1 See Alesina and Perotti (1995a), (1995b), (1996a) and (1996b), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Corsetti
and Roubini (1996), Grilli et al. (1991), Hahm et al. (1995), von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and 
Harden (1994).
2 See Perotti (1996a) and (1996b).2
Section 2 of the paper describes the basic principles and features of the Excessive Deficit
Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact. Sections 3 and 4 examine the budgetary
policies carried out during recessions in the 1961-1996 period. More specifically,
Section 3 presents the real growth and output gap concepts used in the paper as well as
the main characteristics of the cyclical adjustment method applied in the paper to
estimate structural budget balances. Section 4 examines the main characteristics of the
severe recessions which occurred during the past 36 years, as well as the associated
budgetary reactions, by analysing cyclical and discretionary changes in budget balances.
The issues of the composition of budgetary adjustments and debt accumulation during
and after severe recessions are also examined.
Sections 5 to 7 “retrospectively” apply the Stability and Growth Pact. Section 5 applies
the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact framework to the
past and analyses under what circumstances the “exceptionality”, “temporariness” and
“closeness” conditions set by the Treaty would have been violated in severe recessions.
Section 6 assesses whether government budgets behave differently in “mild” recessions
and during abrupt slowdowns in growth than in deeper recessions. The length of the
adjustment period needed to bring the deficit back below the 3% of GDP ceiling once
the recession is over is examined in Section 7.
Section 8 summarises the main results of the analysis and its policy implications.
Section 9 concludes by pointing to some areas that require further research.
 ,QVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUN
Solid budgetary discipline is considered to be an essential condition for the success of
EMU. The requirement of achieving a sound budgetary position in order to join the
single currency and maintaining budgetary prudence once in EMU are at the core of the
Maastricht Treaty. The general principles and procedures of the Treaty are currently
being spelled out in detail in secondary legislation, which forms the so-called “Stability
and Growth Pact”.
7KH7UHDW\Article 104c of the Treaty on European Union states at the outset that, in
the third and final stage of EMU, “Member States shall avoid excessive government
deficits”
3. The compliance of a Member State with the budgetary discipline requirement
will be assessed LQWHUDOLD on the basis of the behaviour of the government deficit as a
share of GDP in relation to a reference value set by the “Protocol on the Excessive
Deficit Procedure” (Protocol 5 of the Treaty) at 3% of GDP.
When an excessive deficit occurs, a procedure aimed at reducing the deficit is initiated.
This includes several steps involving an increasing “pressure” on the Member State
through recommendations and notice to take effective measures to correct the excessive
deficit position. If such a correction does not take place, the Treaty foresees that
sanctions may be applied to the Member State participating in EMU.
                                                          
3 As to the second stage, the Treaty stipulates that “Member States shall endeavour to avoid excessive
government deficits”. Currently, only three Member States (namely Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg) are
not in excessive deficit. Germany, which in the 1995 exercise was also among the “virtuous countries”,
dropped out in 1996 because its budget deficit attained 3.5% of GDP in 1995 and was forecast to remain
above the reference value in 1996.3
The 3% threshold can be exceeded without causing an excessive deficit, but only under a
restrictive set of conditions. In particular, three conditions must be met:
(a) exceptionality: the origin of the excess has to be outside of the normal range of
situations;
(b) temporariness: the deficit is allowed to remain above 3% of GDP only for a limited
period of time;
(c) closeness: the deficit must remain close to the reference value.
In practice, the Treaty prescribes that the original cause of the rise of the deficit above
the 3% ceiling must be exceptional, that the deficit must not, in any case, exceed this
threshold by too much, and must return promptly below it once the initial driving force is
over. These three conditions need to apply simultaneously. The extent of the common
subset of events not giving rise to an excessive deficit depends on the degree of
restriction with which these conditions are interpreted. The Treaty, however, does not
specify the exact content of the three constraints. The Stability and Growth Pact gives a
more precise interpretation to conditions (a) and (b).
7KH6WDELOLW\DQG*URZWK3DFW The European Council reached an agreement on the
principles and the main features of the Stability and Growth Pact in Dublin in December
1996
4. The core elements of the agreement include:
·  setting time limits to the various steps of the Excessive Deficit Procedure so as to
speed it up and, where appropriate, impose sanctions within the calendar year in
which the decision on the existence of the excessive deficit is taken;
·  defining the meaning of the exceptionality and temporariness conditions;
·  specifying the conditions in which sanctions will be applied and their scale.
The starting point of the Dublin agreement is that the EMU Members should set
medium-term budgetary targets which are “close-to-balance or in surplus”, thus allowing
them to respect the 3% ceiling even during economic downturns.
The exceptionality clause (condition (a)) can be called upon when the excess of the
deficit over the reference value results from an unusual event outside the control of the
Member State in question and which has a major impact on the financial position of the
general government. Alternatively, it can apply if the deficit overshooting takes place in
the presence of a severe economic downturn. The latter is considered “exceptional” if
there is an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2%.
An annual fall of GDP of less than 2% could nevertheless be considered exceptional in
the light of further supporting evidence, such as the abruptness of the downturn or the
accumulated loss of output relative to past trends. In any event, in evaluating whether the
economic downturn is severe, the Member States will, as a rule, take an annual fall in
real GDP of at least 0.75% as a reference point. This condition recognises that, in the
event of a harsh and persistent recession, the budgetary room for manoeuvre between
                                                          
4 A first proposal for a Pact to ensure fiscal discipline in stage three of EMU was put forward by the German
Finance Minister T. Waigel in November 1995. It was formalised in an official proposal for a Council
Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, presented
by the Commission in October 1996 (see Commission of the European Communities (1996a)). This first
proposal was complemented by a second proposal which represents the “preventive” arm of the Stability
and Growth Pact (see Commission of the European Communities (1996b)).4
close to balance and a deficit of 3% of GDP may not be sufficient to cushion the
negative effects of the shock on economic activity.
As to the temporary nature of the excess of the deficit over 3% of GDP (condition (b)),
the agreement is to allow it only insofar as the “exceptional” conditions mentioned
above persist. If the Commission’s budgetary forecasts indicate that the deficit would not
fall below the reference value in the year following the recession, the country would also
be put into a position of excessive deficit in the year of the recession because it had
violated the “temporariness” clause.
The conclusions of the Dublin European Council do not deal with the closeness
condition (condition (c)).
Graph 1 illustrates the five relevant paths for the deficit during and after an exceptionally
severe recession, by indicating for each of them the occurrence or not of an excessive
deficit position.
In order of “seriousness”:
a) the no-problem case, in which, in spite of the recession, the deficit remains below the
3% threshold;
b) the limited-problem case, in which the deficit exceeds 3% of GDP during the
recession, but remains close to it and returns below it immediately after the recession:
the three conditions mentioned above apply, hence no excessive deficit occurs;
c) the violation of the closeness condition, in which the deficit is pushed up well above
the reference value, but moves promptly below it as soon as the recession is over: the
country is in excessive deficit during the year of the recession, but no sanctions are
imposed on it;
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d) the violation of the temporariness clause, in which the deficit remains fairly close to
the 3% ceiling during the recession year, but as it does not move below it in the year
after the recession, the country is in excessive deficit during the year of the recession
and, unless effective measures to correct the deficit are implemented, there is a
presumption that sanctions will be applied;
e) the double-violation case, in which both the temporariness and closeness conditions
are not respected: there is an excessive deficit which, as in the previous case, could
eventually lead to sanctions.
The decision on whether or not an excessive deficit existed during the year of the
recession is taken on the basis of figures for the recession year which are reported one
year later. In order to avoid the imposition of sanctions, the Member State which has
been put into excessive deficit needs to take immediate action in the year in which the
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is taken. The correction of the deficit
should be completed in the year following the identification of the excessive deficit, i.e.
in order to avoid sanctions, the Member State concerned should bring back its deficit
below the reference value two years after the occurrence of an excessive deficit and one
year after its identification, unless special circumstances are given.
 &RQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUN*'3JURZWKRXWSXWJDSVF\FOLFDO
DGMXVWPHQW
This paper considers two concepts of “economic downturn”: a decline in real GDP and a
worsening of the output gap. As already pointed out in the previous section, the Dublin
agreement refers to negative real GDP growth rates. This is the main yardstick used in
this paper. This measure is supplemented with the output gap concept, which, though not
uncontroversial, allows a broader assessment of the budgetary impact of economic
downturns. More specifically, the output gap allows an analysis of the budgetary
implications of protracted periods of low positive growth, as well as those in which the
rate of growth declines abruptly but still remains positive. The output gap is also
implicitly referred to in the Dublin agreement when the exceptionality of cases with
negative growth of less than 2% is qualified
5.
'HILQLWLRQRI³VHYHUHHFRQRPLFGRZQWXUQ´
The analysis in this paper is based on a definition of a “severe economic downturn”
consistent with the Dublin agreement: a “severe recession” is defined as involving a
negative annual real GDP growth rate of 0.75% or more, while a fall in GDP of 2% or
more in one year is characterised as an “exceptionally severe recession”. Negative
growth of less than 0.75% does not qualify as a severe recession, and is therefore
characterised as a “mild downturn”.
The 0.75% yardstick allows to examine a substantial number of recession cases, which
ensures the robustness of the results. Recessions involving a fall in GDP of 2% or more
are, however, also identified separately in the analysis.
                                                          
5 The report by the Ecofin Council for the December 1996 European Council meeting in Dublin states that
“The Council when deciding whether an excessive deficit exists will in its overall assessment take into
account any observations made by the Member State showing that an annual fall of real GDP of less than
2% is nevertheless exceptional in the light of further supporting evidence, in particular on the abruptness of
the downturn or on the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends”.6
As can be seen in Table 1, the total number of cases with a negative annual real GDP
growth rate is 45 for the fifteen EU Member States together over the period 1961-1996,
which corresponds to an average of three cases per country or a frequency of 8.3%. Most
of these negative growth years are concentrated around the three major recession periods
of 1974-1975, 1980-1982 and 1991-1993.
For all fifteen Member States over the last 36 years, there were 30 cases when negative
growth was 0.75% or worse, i.e. an average of two cases per country or a frequency of
5.6%. The number of years of negative growth of 0.75% or more is distributed unevenly
among Member States. The Nordic countries as well as Belgium, Germany, Portugal and
the United Kingdom have registered a larger number of severe recession years compared
to the average of two cases per country, while Spain, France, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands recorded a smaller number of cases. Ireland and Austria did not have a
severe recession over the past 36 years. There were only 7 cases where real GDP fell by
2% or more in one year.
In this paper, the periods of two or more consecutive years of negative growth, in which
GDP declines by 0.75% or more in at least one year, are treated as single severe
“recession episodes”
6. Over the period 1961-1996, there have been 9 cases where real
GDP declined during two or three consecutive years and for which in at least one of
these recession years there was negative growth of 0.75% or more
7. As a result of this
approach, the 30 years where there was negative growth of 0.75% or more collapse into
25 severe recession episodes
8. As no budgetary data are available for the 1974 recession
in Greece, only 24 cases have been taken into account for the calculations in this paper.
Amongst them, 5 episodes involve a negative growth of GDP of 2% or more.
                                                          
6 This approach seems consistent with the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Before the decision on the existence
of an excessive deficit is taken, an examination of the economic situation of the Member State in question is
carried out. This examination is based on the data reporting in March of the year following that in which the
excessive deficit occurs. At the moment of the reporting, it can be estimated whether the recession was a
one-year or a multi-year recession. When there is a fall of real GDP by 0.75% or more in the first year, the
recession may be characterised as a severe recession (if supported by other relevant evidence). At the time
of the reporting, it can also be estimated, when there is negative growth of less than 0.75% in the first year,
whether negative growth is 0.75% or more in the second year. In this case, the full episode could also
qualify as a severe recession.
7 7 cases occurred in the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom, the other 2 in the Netherlands and
Portugal.
8 See Annex 1 for more detailed information on the total of 25 severe recession episodes which occurred for
all fifteen Member States over the period 1961-1996.
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$FWXDODQGF\FOLFDOO\DGMXVWHGEXGJHWEDODQFHV
The effects of sudden and important variations in economic growth on the government’s
budgetary position can be examined by decomposing the actual budget balance into a
cyclical and a structural or cyclically adjusted component. While the former shows the
effect on the government budget of cyclical fluctuations around the trend level, the latter
reflects what the budget balance would be if economic activity were at its trend level.
However, the cyclically adjusted balance does not correct for all changes in the
budgetary position due to changes in the economic environment. For instance, it still
includes the implications of changes in inflation and real interest rates
9. In order to
exclude these effects, the cyclically adjusted primary balance is used in this paper.
Changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance provide a rough indication of whether
the government is taking discretionary action towards consolidation or whether there is a
deterioration in the fundamental budgetary situation and can therefore be viewed as
indicative of the restrictive or expansionary stance of budgetary policy.
The influence of cyclical fluctuations on government budget balances is calculated by
multiplying the output gap by the marginal sensitivity of budgetary receipts and
expenditures to GDP. The trend output benchmark is estimated via the Hodrick-Prescott
filter
10. The output gap is defined as the difference between the actual level of GDP and
that of trend GDP, expressed as a percentage of trend GDP.
The cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance depends on the size of the government
sector, the progressivity of the tax system, the generosity of the unemployment
compensation schemes and the sensitivity of unemployment to fluctuations in output.
Cyclical fluctuations in revenues are usually much larger than those in expenditure: the
decrease in government revenue during a recession accounts for four fifths of the
cyclical deterioration of the government deficit, while the increase in expenditure only
accounts for one fifth.
As can be seen in Table 2, the sensitivity of the budget balance to the cycle lies at around
0.5 for the European Union as a whole
11. This means that each deterioration of a
negative output gap by 1% point of trend GDP increases the actual government deficit by
0.5% points of GDP.
                                                          
9 This has been pointed out by, for example, Blanchard (1990) and Bredenkamp (1988). Other influences on
the budget which are beyond the direct control of the government and which are not corrected for in the
cyclically adjusted balance are: changes in receipts from natural resources, fluctuations in exchanges rates,
etc.
10 The Hodrick-Prescott trend estimation method produces output gaps which are symmetric over the series,
and therefore sum to zero on average over the period 1961-1996. The negative output gaps produced by this
method are relatively small compared to those produced by other methods, such as, for example, the
production function approach. In addition, the method smoothes over structural breaks, such as those which
occured in Finland and Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s. For more detailed explanations, see
Commission of the European Communities (1995). For a critical review of detrending methods, see Canova
(1993). The OECD and the IMF use the Cobb-Douglas production function for the estimation of potential
output, as explained respectively in Giorno et al. (1995) and IMF (1993).
11 OECD (1993) found the same coefficient for the average of all OECD countries.8
The sensitivity of the
budget balance to the
cycle is smaller for the
southern countries and
is relatively large for
the Nordic Member
States. It ranges from
0.4 for Greece to 0.85
for Sweden.
As shown in Table 3,
the size of the
budgetary automatic
stabilisers, as
measured by the
cyclical component of
budget balances, is
quite important for
most EU Member
States and varies
substantially across
Member States and
over time.
The cyclical impact on
government budgets is
both higher and more
volatile in the smaller
Member States and in
the Nordic countries
than in the larger
Member States.
In most Member
States, the cyclical
component varies on
average by around 1%
point of GDP in either
direction around its
mean. As can be seen
from the lowest
negative and highest
positive values of the
cyclical components
over the period 1961-1996 presented in Table 3, the cyclical component for all but two
EU Member States never surpassed the 3% of GDP value on either side and even
remained below the 2% value in six Member States. Cyclical components around 4% to
5% were only registered in Finland and Sweden during the exceptionally severe
recession at the beginning of the 1990s.
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%XGJHWDU\UHDFWLRQVGXULQJVHYHUHUHFHVVLRQV
The effect of severe recession episodes on the budgetary situation can be analysed by
setting out the changes in the actual budget balances and the cyclically adjusted primary
balances between the year preceding the recession and that in which the recession takes
place or reaches its final year against the variation in the output gap over the same
period.
The difference between the actual and the trend growth rate determines the variation of
the output gap. When the actual growth rate falls below the trend growth rate during a
recession, there is a worsening of the output gap, i.e. positive output gaps turn negative
and existing negative output gaps widen further.
In Graph 2, the change in the actual
budget deficit between the year
preceding the recession (t-1) and that
in which the recession takes place or
reaches its final year (t) is set out
against the change in the output gap
over the same period. Graph 2 shows
that the 24 severe recession episodes
with negative growth of 0.75% or
more over the period 1961-1996
produced extremely different changes
in the output gap: the output gap
deteriorated by between 2.5 to around
15% points of trend GDP. On
average, output gaps deteriorated by
5.5% points.
The cumulative widening of the
output gap between the year before
the recession and the last year of the
recession is obviously much larger
during multi-year recession episodes
(shown by the dark markers) than for single-year recessions. While in most one-year
recession episodes (12 out of 15) the gap increased by around 2.5 to 4.5% points, in most
multi-year episodes (8 out of 9) it increased by around 4.5 to 7.5% points.
The actual budget balance will tend to worsen during a recession if the automatic
stabilisers are not offset completely. As can be seen in Graph 2, most Member States’
actual budget deficits increased by between zero and 7% points of GDP during the
severe recession episodes which occurred over the period 1961-1996. On average, actual
budget deficits increased by around 3.5% points. Graph 2 also shows that the cumulative
increase of the actual deficit is not necessarily larger for multi-year recessions than for
single-year recessions.
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Graph 3 provides some indications
about the discretionary budgetary
policy stance - defined as the change
in the structural primary balance -
adopted during the severe recession
episodes of the period 1961-1996.
There is an almost even distribution
of changes in the structural primary
balances above and below the zero-
line, i.e. in about half of the cases a
counter-cyclical budgetary stance
which increased the structural
primary deficit was adopted, while in
the other half, a pro-cyclical policy
was undertaken which reduced the
structural primary deficit. Taking the
average of all recessions episodes, the
structural primary balance remained
virtually unchanged. There was thus
no systematic tendency on average to
loosen budgetary policy during severe recessions over the past decades.
There was no systematic tendency either to adopt more frequently a looser budgetary
policy during multi-year recession episodes than during one-year recessions. Portugal
and the United Kingdom carried out a budgetary retrenchment policy at the beginning of
the 1980s in order to avoid that their budget deficits got out of hand, in spite of a severe
and persistent recession, with a strong widening of the output gap by between 6 to 7%
points of trend GDP. When its output gap worsened by 7.5% points during the recession
of 1991-1993, Sweden, however, judged the recession to be severe enough and its
budgetary room for manoeuvre to be large enough to undertake a substantial budgetary
relaxation. Finland, which registered a worsening by 15% points of its output gap during
the 1991-1993 recession, loosened its budgetary policy during the first two recession
years but significantly tightened its budgetary stance during the third year, so that over
the full recession episode its structural primary deficit remained unchanged.
The average budgetary stance over all recession episodes hides substantial differences in
budgetary behaviour over different recession periods and depends on the pre-recession
budgetary position of Member States.
0DMRUUHFHVVLRQSHULRGV
Did the budgetary reaction of Member States, when confronted with a severe recession,
change over time?
Over the years 1961-1996 taken into consideration in this paper, most recessions were
concentrated in three periods: 1974-1975, 1980-1982 and 1991-1993. The first and
second recession periods were triggered by the two oil price shocks; the third by the
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effects of the banking crisis and the collapse of the Soviet-Union in the Nordic countries
as well as the tight monetary policy in the aftermath of the German unification
12.
As can be seen in Table 4, real GDP on average declined by 2.8% during both the first
and third recession periods. The recession of 1980-1982 was less severe, with an average
drop in real GDP of 1.7%. The output gap worsened more during the 1974-1975
recession than during the 1991-1993 recession, even though the negative growth rates
were the same. This can be explained by the fact that trend growth was significantly
higher in the mid-1970s than at the beginning of the 1990s
13.
During the 1974-1975 period, five Member States registered a severe recession with a
negative growth of 0.75% or more in 1975, while Denmark and the United Kingdom
recorded negative growth in both 1974 and 1975.
As can be seen in Table 4, these countries increased their structural primary deficit by
0.5% points of GDP on average. Four Member States (Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg
and Italy) carried out an expansionary budgetary policy to offset the shock, with the
structural primary deficit increasing by between 0.3 to 2.7% points. Belgium and
Portugal adopted a weak pro-cyclical budgetary stance, which reduced their structural
primary deficit by 0.4 to 0.8% points, while the UK took an even more restrictive stance.
During the 1980-1982 period, there was a predominance of multi-year recession
episodes. Belgium and Germany registered a negative annual real GDP growth rate of
more than 0.75% in 1981 and 1982 respectively, while Denmark and the United
Kingdom recorded negative growth in both 1980 and 1981 and the Netherlands in both
1981 and 1982.
                                                          
12 Budgetary policies in Western countries over the period 1970-1994 are examined in de Haan et al. (1992),
Leibfritz et al. (1994) and Tanzi and Fanizza (1995).
13 However, the levels of the negative output gaps were fairly similar during both the first and third major
recession periods. This is due to the fact that the positive output gaps registered in the year preceding the
first major recession were larger than those recorded in the year preceding the third recession. In the years
preceding the 1991-1993 recession, the boom of the middle and end of the 1980s had lost steam and
economic activity had already slowed down. A larger variation in the output gap applied to a higher positive
output gap gave thus the same negative output gap level in the first major recession as that recorded in the
third recession, when a smaller variation was applied to a lower positive output gap.
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Most of the Member States hit by this recession undertook a budgetary consolidation
policy, with the extent of the fiscal retrenchment undertaken being relatively important.
Structural primary deficits were reduced by 1.7% points of GDP on average. As budget
deficits had remained high after the first oil shock, less room for manoeuvre was
available to combat the second oil shock via budgetary policy. Moreover, the need for
counter-cyclical policies was more limited as this recession was less severe.
During the last major recession, seven Member States (Belgium, Germany, Greece,
Spain, France, Italy and Portugal) registered negative growth of more than 0.75% in
1993, while Finland and Sweden recorded negative growth in the three consecutive years
of the period 1991-1993 and the United Kingdom in both 1991 and 1992.
Over the 1991-1993 recession episode, structural primary deficits increased by 0.8% of
GDP on average. This increase can be entirely attributed to the worsening that took place
in the Nordic countries: 4.3% points of GDP on average. The other countries adopted a
slightly tighter fiscal stance and on average decreased their structural primary deficit by
0.7% of GDP.
Highly-indebted Member States, such as Belgium and Italy, implemented a significant
budgetary tightening during this recession and decreased their structural primary deficit
by more than 1.5% point of GDP, while Germany also undertook some budgetary
consolidation. Most other Member States adopted a slightly expansionary stance and let
their structural primary deficits increase by between 0.2 to 1.2% points of GDP. Sweden
conducted a substantial fiscal relaxation policy in order to combat its major multi-year
recession and increased its structural primary deficit over this recession episode by 8.2%
points of GDP. Finland’s structural primary deficit increased by 0.2% of GDP.
On the whole, budgetary reactions to recessions seem to have become more prudent
since the early 1980s. This may be related to the worsening of the pre-recession deficit
and debt levels. The average deficit for the EU as a whole increased from less than 1%
of GDP in 1973 to about 3% in 1979 and 3.5% in 1990. In most countries, the debt to
GDP ratio was also higher at the beginning of the second and third recession periods
than in the early 1970s. Moreover, the debt ratio was set on an upward trend in several
countries. These changes increased the risks involved in supplementing the automatic
stabilisers with active counter-cyclical policies. The constraint to the implementation of
these policies is also evident in the fact that, in the two most recent recession periods, the
share of interest payments to GDP increased much more than in the first.
%XGJHWDU\PDUJLQRIPDQRHXYUH
Were budgetary reactions influenced by pre-recession budgetary positions?
Countries with high debt ratios and with a high deficit in the year before the recession
can be expected to judge their budgetary room for manoeuvre to be insufficient to
conduct a significant fiscal relaxation and therefore to adopt a cautious policy stance,
while countries with low pre-recession deficit and debt ratios may be more likely to
undertake fiscal relaxation.13
It should be stressed that pre-recession budgetary positions may be affected by
expectations about the need for active counter-cyclical policies: countries experiencing
relatively big output swings may aim at maintaining low deficit and debt levels in order
to have more room for manoeuvre in the event of a recession. The same argument
applies to countries where the effects of automatic stabilisers are reduced by greater
exposure to international trade and may therefore require supplementary discretionary
action to cushion negative shocks.
Table 5 provides some preliminary indications on the possible relation between initial
public finance imbalances and budgetary behaviour during severe recessions. A Member
State is classified as being in a relatively difficult pre-recession budgetary situation if
both its deficit and debt ratio in the year before the recession are higher than the EU
average, while Member States with pre-recession deficit and debt ratios below the EU
average are considered to be in a relatively easier budgetary position.
Table 5 confirms that Member States with deficit and debt ratios above the EU average
in the year before the recession conducted a less accommodating budgetary policy: these
Member States tightened their fiscal stance and reduced their structural primary deficit
by 1.2% points of GDP on average during severe recession episodes
14. Fiscal
retrenchment policies aimed at preventing a worsening of the budgetary situation were
adopted especially during protracted recession periods.
On the contrary, Member States with low deficit and debt ratios compared to the EU
average undertook budgetary relaxation policies during recessions: these Member States
increased their structural primary deficits with 0.8% points
15. Member States undergoing
a protracted recession substantially loosened their budgetary policy.
)HDWXUHVRIEXGJHWDU\UHDFWLRQVGXULQJDQGDIWHUVHYHUHUHFHVVLRQV
Which budgetary adjustments in terms both of total deficit and composition took place
during and after severe recessions?
                                                          
14 These results are consistent with the comments on this issue by Leibfritz et al (1994).
15 These results still hold when Finland and Sweden, which had a severe multi-year recession at the beginning
of the 1990s during which they undertook a fiscal relaxation, are taken out.
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As can be seen in Table 6, the 24 recession episodes were associated with an average
rise in the budget deficit by 3.6% points of GDP: the increase in the deficit due to the
working of the automatic stabilisers (3.1% points of GDP) was supplemented by a small
increase in the structural deficit by 0.5% points. The worsening of the structural deficit
was the net result of a substantial increase in interest payments (0.7% points), while the
structural primary balance remained practically unchanged.
In the first year after the recession, there was a small improvement in the budgetary
situation (0.6% points of GDP), largely due to the rebound in economic activity. The
improvement in the cyclical component of the deficit (0.4% points) was supplemented
by a small discretionary tightening (the structural primary deficit declined by 0.3%
points of GDP).
As to the composition of the budgetary changes, Table 6 also shows that there has been a
substantial increase in expenditure during severe recessions over the past 36 years:
overall structural expenditure increased by around 4% points of GDP, with structural
primary expenditure increasing by 3.3% points. This increase in expenditure may be
caused by either active policy decisions or by “unintended” effects of recessions. Indeed,
when the depth of the recession entails a large drop in economic activity, part of the
“discretionary” rise in the ratio of government expenditure to GDP is due to inertia in
budgetary processes and commitments. This effect is particularly important in the case of
the public sector wage bill, which usually depends on predetermined contractual
arrangements and enrolment plans, and for transfers to households, which may depend
on indexation mechanisms and long-term trends in demography, household structures
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and pension scheme maturation. In the short term, public investment expenditure and
purchases of goods and services may also show some inertia
16.
Discretionary rises in tax revenue partially offset the expenditure increases: Table 6
shows that structural revenue increased by 3.5% points of GDP on average during severe
recessions
17. In the year following the recession, tax revenue stabilised while structural
primary expenditure was reduced (0.4% of GDP).
Discretionary tax increases during recessions are SULPD IDFLH counter-intuitive. They
may be explained by a number of not-mutually exclusive reasons:
a) taxes may have to be raised, in spite of the difficult economic times, in order to keep
revenue at “acceptable” levels and prevent the budget deficit from getting out of hand,
following substantial “voluntary” or “unintended” increases in the ratio of
government expenditure to GDP;
b) in the stagflation of the 1970s, the non-compensation of rising real tax rates, through
creeping tax brackets, led “automatically” to discretionary rises in taxes;
c) due to the existing budgetary process, policy-makers had perhaps decided to raise
taxes at the end of the pre-recession period, before it became clear that economic
activity was undergoing a contraction; sticky political and institutional procedures
may have prevented the reversal of those decisions.
In order to evaluate whether the extent of the economic downturn affects the
composition of budgetary reactions, the recession episodes have been arbitrarily split
into two groups: those with an output gap change of less than 5% points and those with a
bigger output gap worsening. Table 6 shows that, while in the first group of recession
episodes revenues and primary expenditure increase by 2.6 and 2.2% points respectively,
in the second group they both increase by 4.3% points. The dynamics of the expenditure
to GDP ratio may support the above mentioned interpretation about the unintended
increases in the expenditure to GDP ratio.
A growing body of literature explores the influence of the initial conditions of public
finances and the composition of the budgetary consolidation on the effectiveness and
durability of the adjustment
18. It points to the fact that when the adjustment is
expenditure-based, it has a higher probability of being durable. It also suggests that, in
“bad times regime”, when public finances are undergoing an important deterioration
19,
budgetary consolidation tends to rely much more on expenditure cuts, in particular in
government consumption, rather than on tax increases.
Which results does the above analysis present in relation, in particular, to the last of
these conclusions? More specifically:
a) are severe recessions at the origin of public finance “bad times”? Or, how much of the
current fiscal imbalance can be attributed to the budgetary stabilisation policies
implemented in recession periods?
b) is the result found in the literature that countries tend to rely more on expenditure cuts
rather than tax increases in “bad times” somehow connected with the budgetary
policies implemented during recessions?
                                                          
16 See the extensive analysis of Dawes and Hurst (1992).
17 Other studies also find evidence of tax rises during recessions. See Alesina and Perotti (1995b).
18 See for example Alesina and Perotti (1995b) and Perotti (1996a) and (1996b).
19 Perotti defines a “bad time regime” as one in which the the government debt ratio is above a certain ceiling
(80% or 100% of GDP) or the change in the debt ratio over the last two years is larger than the average of
the previous two years by at least 5 or 7% points of GDP. See Perotti (1996b).16
As to the first question, budgetary policies carried out during recessions all in all do not
seem to have contributed substantially to the build-up in government debt that occurred
in many EU Member States over the last decades: on average, structural primary deficits
were not increased during recessions nor in the years immediately afterwards. As
indicated in Table 6, on average these deficits were actually reduced by 0.4% points
(0.1% during the recessions, 0.3% in the first year following them).
Table 7 compares the total change in debt to GDP ratios that occurred in the period
1970-1996 with the change that took place in periods of economic downturn (either
severe or mild recessions and abrupt slowdowns).
In two Member States (Luxembourg and the United Kingdom), the very limited
increases in the debt ratio occurring during recession episodes were fully reversed by the
reductions achieved in other periods. In Finland, Ireland and Sweden nearly all the
increase in the debt ratio took place during economic slowdowns. However, if in the
future these countries confirm past experiences, it may be expected that the large rise in
the debt to GDP ratio which took place during the last recession will eventually be re-
absorbed in non-recession periods.
In the remaining Member States most of the increase in the debt ratio took place in non-
recession periods when budgetary policies did not counterbalance the effects of the
recession on debt dynamics, but even further increased the debt ratio. Clearly, the
budgetary policies implemented by the third group of countries are not consistent with
the Excessive Deficit Procedure and Stability and Growth Pact framework, which
implicitly allow some limited public finance imbalances only during recessions and
require debt decumulation in the years following the recession.
As to the second question, the contribution of this study is limited, since it does not
analyse budgetary developments in the years following the recession. As a preliminary
exercise, the recession episodes were divided into two groups, depending on the extent
of the increase in the deficit during the recession: more or less than 3% of GDP. This
subdivision provides a rough indication of budgetary reactions to severe recessions. The
different composition of the changes in the structural primary deficit for each group are
presented in Table 6.
The episodes involving an increase of the deficit of more than 3% points show a
substantial worsening of the structural deficit (2.5% points) as against a reduction in the
other group of recession episodes (-1.1% points). This pattern is determined by the
higher increase in the ratio of primary expenditure to GDP in the first group of episodes
(4.8% points, as against 2.1% in the second group) and by the lower increase in the ratio
of revenues to GDP (3.1% points, as against 3.9%). This result indicates that countries
managing recession episodes on a more prudent basis rely both on substantial revenue
increases and relatively tighter expenditure controls.17
 ³5HWURVSHFWLYH´DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH([FHVVLYH'HILFLW3URFHGXUHDQG
WKH6WDELOLW\DQG*URZWK3DFW
In this section, the Stability and Growth Pact framework is applied to EU Member
States’ budgetary outcomes during recession years over the period 1961-1996. This
retrospective application exercise aims at providing answers to the following questions:
how many recessions would have led to excessive deficits, and, more specifically, to
violations of the “temporary nature of deficit” clause or the “close to 3%” clause? Which
were the features of these specific recessions? Which level of pre-recession budget
balance could have avoided situations that would now be considered as excessive
deficits?
0HWKRGRORJ\DQGDVVXPSWLRQV
The Excessive Deficit Procedure did not exist for most of the period considered;
therefore, the 3% reference value for the government deficit did not have any policy
relevance
20. This means that the difference between actual deficit levels and the 3%
threshold during recessions does not provide any indication relevant for understanding
the potential working of this procedure in the past. For this purpose, it is more
appropriate to focus on the changes in deficit during and after recessions.
More precisely, the actual deficit changes are superimposed on an arbitrary “pre-
recession deficit”. Starting from any value of the deficit, the deterioration of the deficit
                                                          
20  Annex 2 shows that in about three quarters of the years in the period 1961-1996, deficits in the fifteen EU
Member States have actually been above the 3% level.
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during the recession (in terms of percentage points of GDP) and its bouncing back once
the recession is over are examined.
Two starting points are considered: a balanced budget (0% deficit), which is obviously
consistent with the “close to balance” requirement and may represent a benchmark for
long-term budgetary targets within EMU, and a 2% deficit, the likely deficit level in
several Member States during the early years of EMU.
The following assumptions are made on the three concomitant clauses of article 104c:
1) the term “exceptional” circumstances is interpreted as a decline in GDP in real
terms of 0.75% or more. As pointed out in Section 3, where GDP declines for
more than one year, the different years are grouped in a single recession episode.
2) The requirement that a deficit in excess of 3% of GDP be "temporary" is
interpreted as a requirement that the deficit returns below 3% in the first year
following the recession.
3) The term “close to the reference value” is arbitrarily defined as a situation in which
the deficit does not exceed the reference value by more than 0.5% point of GDP
21.
For instance, if a Member State is assumed to have a deficit of 2% of GDP in the year
before a severe recession, it will be put into a position of excessive deficit during the
recession if either its deficit increases by more than 1.5% points of GDP in the year of
the recession or if it increases by 1% to 1.5% points in the recession but does return
below the 3% threshold as soon as the recession is over, or if both these violations occur
simultaneously.
0DLQUHVXOWV
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of the exercise for the two arbitrary starting points taken
into consideration for the pre-recession deficit. On the vertical dimension, each table
shows the change in deficit in the recession period with respect to the year before the
recession; on the horizontal dimension it considers the change in deficit in the first year
after the recession period with respect to the year before the recession. Five areas,
corresponding to the five relevant cases outlined in Section 2, can be identified:
a) the no-problem area (white area - no excessive deficit);
b) the limited-problem area (light grey area - no excessive deficit);
c) the violation of closeness area (medium grey area - “transient” excessive deficit);
d) the violation of temporariness area (medium grey area - excessive deficit),
e) the double violation area (dark grey area - excessive deficit).
                                                          
21  The tables presented in this section also show the implications of setting the excess margin at 1%.19
As can be seen in Table 8, starting from a pre-recession balanced budget, the deficit
exceeds the 3% level in 11 recession episodes. In one of these cases (E 1993), the deficit
remains below 3.5% during the recession period and returns below 3% in the following
year. In 5 other cases (B 1981, D 1975, I 1975, L 1975, P 1993), the deficit exceeds the
3.5% level and returns below 3% in the following year. In 5 events (DK 1974-1975 and
1980-1981, FIN 1991-1992, S 1991-1993, UK 1991-1992), the deficit exceeds the 3.5%
level and remains above the 3% level in the year following the recession.
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In two cases (P 1975 and S 1977), the deficit stays below the 3% reference value during
the recession but moves above it in the year following the recession. These countries
would not be put into an excessive deficit position for the year of the recession, which is
the angle taken for the analysis in Table 8, but would be put in excessive deficit in the
year after the recession.
Table 9 shows that a pre-recession 2% deficit leads to 18 cases in which the deficit
exceeds the 3% level. There are violations of closeness in one case (EL 1993) and of
temporariness in one case (UK 1974-75). Both clauses are violated in 16 recessions (B
1981, D 1975, DK 1974-75 and 1980-81, E 1993, F 1993, FIN 1991-92, I 1975, L 1975,
NL 1981-82, P 1975 and 1993, S 1977 and 1991-93, UK 1991-92) involving 12
countries.
The exercises presented above are summarised in Table 10. The following conclusions
can be drawn:
a) As expected, the lower the pre-recession deficit, the lower the probability of
breaching the 3% threshold and violating the closeness and temporariness clauses.
For instance, moving from the 2% pre-recession deficit exercise to the balanced
budget exercise makes the breaches of the 3% threshold decline from 18 to 11; a
similar pattern is found for the violations of the closeness condition (from 17 to 10),
while the violations of the temporariness clause decline even more sharply (from 17
to 5).
b) Nearly all cases in which deficits exceed the 3% threshold give rise to an excessive
deficit situation (there is only one exception in the 0% exercise).
c) The early years of EMU, where several countries are likely to record deficits close to
2%, are likely to be extremely problematic in the event of a severe recession. Over the
period 1961-1996, with this pre-recession deficit, nearly three quarters of recessions
would have resulted in a breach of the 3.5% level or in a deficit above 3% in the year
following the recession. Two-thirds of the recessions would have resulted in a
violation of both conditions.
d) A pre-recession balanced budget would have prevented all one-year recessions from
resulting in a deficit above the 3% level in the year following the recession.
e) The risk of incurring an excessive deficit is relatively high for countries involved in
lengthy recessions which result in significant negative output gaps and make it
extremely difficult to re-absorb the deficit within the first year of recovery. As already
pointed out, in 9 out of the 24 recession episodes considered, GDP declines for two or
three years. In 5 of these 9 events, even starting with a balanced budget, the deficit
exceeds the 3.5% level in the recession period and remains above the 3% level during
the following year.
f)  The risk of incurring an excessive deficit is very high in cases where the fall in GDP
exceeds 2%. Even in the 0% exercise, temporariness and closeness are respectively
violated in 2 and 4 cases out of 5. In the 2% before-the-recession deficit exercise,
there is a violation of both the closeness and temporariness clauses in all the 5
recession episodes involving such a fall.
g) For the calculations carried out in this section, the allowed excess over the 3% ceiling
has been arbitrarily set at 0.5% of GDP. A different value would have changed only
the proportion of limited problem cases and cases of a violation of the closeness
condition as defined in Graph 1 in Section 2.21
A bigger excess margin would have increased the number of no excessive deficits
compared to the number of “transient” excessive deficits. For the purpose of
imposing sanctions on persistent offenders, nothing would have changed
22.
All in all, the analysis in this section points to the need to take the problems of countries
undergoing lengthy or very deep recessions into account in the implementation of the
Stability and Growth Pact. It also calls for a fast move to a balanced budget and for some
attention for the problems that will be encountered during the early years of EMU in the
event of a severe downturn.
 ³0LOG´UHFHVVLRQVDQGDEUXSWVORZGRZQVDUHWKHUHKLGGHQ
SUREOHPV"
This section examines budgetary outcomes during two additional types of economic
slowdown: mild recessions, in which GDP declines by less than 0.75%, and periods of
economic slowdown, in which the rate of growth declines abruptly but still remains
positive. The analysis provides indications about the risk that these events, which do not
qualify as exceptional, produce excessive deficits.
0LOGUHFHVVLRQV
Over the period 1961-1996 there were 9 cases of negative GDP growth in the 0 to 0.75%
range
23. The output gap widened by around 3% points of trend GDP on average in these
episodes, as against over 5% points in the 24 episodes considered in Sections 3, 4 and 5.
The increase in the deficit was relatively limited, 0.7% points, as against 3.6% points in
the 24 episodes. This is due to the different stance of discretionary policies, which
reduced the structural primary deficit by 1.1% points of GDP, while in the 24 episodes it
decreased by 0.1% points.
                                                          
22 An allowed excess margin of 1% of GDP would have increased the number of recession episodes with no
excessive deficits from 1 to 3 cases (out of 24 recession episodes) in the 0% before-the-recession deficit
exercise and from 0 to 1 case in the 2% exercise. The number of violations of closeness would have
conversely declined from 5 to 3 in the 0% exercise and from 1 to 0 in the 2% exercise.
23  See Annex 3 for more detailed information on the mild recession episodes which occurred for all fifteen
Member States over the period 1961-1996.
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As can be seen in Table 11, assuming a pre-recession balanced budget, there is only one
case of excessive deficit. More specifically, this is a case in which the deficit is in the 3.5
to 4% range in the recession period and does not return below 3% in the following year
(A 1975). This was due to a substantial expansionary budgetary policy in the year of the
recession (an increase in the structural primary deficit by about 1.7% points of GDP),
followed by a failure to exploit the high growth rate recorded in the following year
 24.
                                                          
24 See OECD (1977) and (1978).
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Note : Selection of mild recessions exclusively (max. GDP decrease = 0.75%)
Explanation of shaded areas :
light grey deficit above reference value, but temporary and close to the reference value.
medium grey violation of temporary nature or closeness.
dark grey violation of both closeness and temporary nature (A).
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As shown in Table 12, a pre-recession deficit of 2% of GDP leads to 5 cases in which
the deficit exceeds the 3% threshold, in 4 of which excessive deficits occur. More
specifically, there are 2 violations of the closeness clause (F 1975 and L 1981), one of
the temporariness clause (E 1981), and one double violation (A 1975). All cases are
characterised by expansionary policies.
This seems to imply that, if budgets are balanced before recession episodes, mild
recessions will not lead to excessive deficits unless strong expansionary policies are
implemented and not reversed after the recession. In other words, experience from the
1961-1996 period points to the fact that there are no downturns other than “severe
recessions” which produce serious budgetary effects.
The exercise confirms the problematic nature of the early years of EMU. For instance, in
the 2% exercise one country (E 1981) violates the temporariness clause in spite of a very
mild expansionary stance (an increase of the structural primary deficit by 0.2% points of
GDP). This is probably due to the fact that the recession year followed 3 years of low
growth and was followed by one more year of low growth.
$EUXSWGHFOLQHLQHFRQRPLFJURZWK
An abrupt decline in economic growth is defined as corresponding to a fall in the GDP
growth rate which still remains positive but produces a worsening of the output gap by at
least 2.5% points
25. As can be seen in Table 13, over the period 1961-1996 there were 17
such episodes (7 of which in Ireland and Portugal). Most took place during the 1960s
and 1970s, when growth rates were relatively high.
                                                          
25 The 2.5% threshold has been selected taking into consideration that 2.5% is the minimum output gap
deterioration in the single-year recessions involving a decline of GDP by at least 0.75% (see Annex 1). This
means that the 2.5% threshold allows to select downturns which produced effects potentially as large as
those produced in the recessions labelled as severe under the 0.75 % condition. See Annex 4 for more
detailed information on the abrupt slowdown episodes.
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medium grey violation of temporary nature or closeness.
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The increase in the deficit was very limited, 0.3% points, as against 3.6% points in the
24 severe recession episodes and 0.7% points during mild recessions. This is due to the
discretionary policy undertaken, which reduced the structural primary deficit by 0.9%
points of GDP.
As can be seen in Table 13, in the before-the-recession balanced budget exercise, these
episodes of sudden decline in the growth rate do not give rise to any excessive deficit
case. The 3% threshold is never actually exceeded. In five cases (I 1971, FIN 1977, D
1974, L 1967 and P 1974), the deficit stays below the 3% reference value during the
recession but moves above it in the year following the recession. These countries would
be put in excessive deficit in the year after the recession.
In the 2% exercise shown in Table 14, there are 6 cases of deficits exceeding the 3%
threshold. Among them, there are 5 cases of violation of both clauses and one case of
violation of temporariness.
This confirms the indications of the mild recession exercise. If budgets are balanced,
major drops in the growth rate do not produce excessive deficits. On the other hand, if
deficits are in the 2% range, as might occur in the early years of EMU, abrupt declines in
growth might also lead some countries into excessive deficits.
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 +RZORQJWRFRUUHFWDQH[FHVVLYHGHILFLW"/HQJWKRIWKHDGMXVWPHQW
SHULRGDIWHUVHYHUHUHFHVVLRQV
The issue of the adjustment period to bring the budget deficit back under the 3%
threshold in the event of a severe recession enters in two different phases of the
application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, according to the rules laid out in the
Stability and Growth Pact:
1) As was pointed out in Section 2, in order to respect the “temporariness” condition, the
deficit has to be back promptly below the 3% ceiling as soon as the severe recession
comes to an end. If this condition is respected, and provided that there had been no
violation of the closeness condition, the Member State in question is considered not
to have an excessive deficit.
2) If the excess over 3% of GDP persists in the year when the recession has come to an
end, the country is declared in an excessive deficit position and is asked to implement
effective measures to re-absorb the deficit. According to the Dublin agreement, in
order to avoid the application of sanctions, effective action should be taken in the year
in which the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit has been takenand the
correction of the excessive deficit should be completed in the year following its
identification, unless special circumstances are given.
Section 5 explored the first issue. The present section deals with the second issue. It
examines the relationship between the deterioration in the budget deficit during the
recession year and the time period necessary to come back to a sound budgetary position
once the recession is over. In policy terms, this section addresses the issue of whether the
depth and the persistence of the recession can be called upon as “special circumstances”
to allow for a longer adjustment period before imposing sanctions.
Tables 15 and 16 look at the length of the adjustment in the budget deficit after a severe
recession - defined, as in the previous sections, as a fall in real GDP of at least 0.75% -
has come to an end.
Along the vertical dimension, the change in deficit in the recession period with respect to
the year before the recession is indicated, taking a balanced budget and a 2% deficit as
the starting points. Along the horizontal dimension, the tables show the number of years
which were necessary for the deficit to be brought back under the 3% ceiling. Countries
indicated in the first column have either been able to go through the recession without
breaching the 3% threshold or have come back below it in the first year following the
recession.
Each table is complemented by a graph picturing the relationship between the adjustment
period and the deterioration in the output gap during the recession episode. As a way of
illustration, the curve depicts an arbitrarily chosen “allowed” adjustment period. The
latter is related to the depth of the recession, proxied by the deterioration in the output
gap during the recession period. For relatively small changes in the output gap, the
adjustment should take place as soon as the recession ends or within two years of the
recession at the latest to avoid sanctions, while for larger output gaps a longer
adjustment period may be allowed before imposing sanctions
26.
                                                          
26 In the graphs, an additional year is allowed in the case of large output gaps before sanctions are imposed.
There would be no change in the results if another additional year were to be granted.26
It is assumed that, in any event, the correction of the deficit should take place within
three years after the recession. Dots situated below the line represent cases of
“appropriate” speed of retrenchment, while dots above it represent “unacceptably” slow
adjustment.
The evidence presented in Tables 15 and 16 as well as graphs 4 and 5 below can be
summarised as follows:
a) Starting with a balanced budget, in a large number of cases (17 out of 24) the
available room for manoeuvre allowed the budget to remain comfortably within the
3% ceiling or to exceed it for one year only. However, in 5 out of 24 cases, the
adjustment took an unacceptably long time of five years or more: 4 of these 5 cases
concerned multi-year recessions (DK 1974-1975 and 1980-1981, FIN 1991-1992, S
1991-1993 and UK 1991-1992).
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 5HWURVSHFWLYHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH([FHVVLYH'HILFLW3URFHGXUH/HQJWKRIWKHDGMXVWPHQWSHULRG
DIWHUDVHYHUHUHFHVVLRQGHILFLWEHIRUHUHFHVVLRQGW￿￿ 
GW￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 3RVW￿UHFHVVLRQ￿\HDU￿LQ￿ZKLFK￿GHILFLW￿LV￿EHORZ￿￿￿￿RI￿*’3
Deterioration in 
recession period (t)
number of 
cases t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 or more
no worsening 2D , P
less equal 1% 4 B, D, I, UK
from 1% to 2% 3 EL, F, UK
from 2% to 3% 4 B, NL P* S
from 3% to 3.5% 1 E
from 3.5% to 4% 2 L*, P
greater than 4% 8 B, D, I* DK DK, FIN*, S*, UK
total 24 17 1 1 - 5
* : GDP decrease of at least 2.0% (of at least 0.75% otherwise)
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b) Moving away from a balanced budget position entails a dramatic drop in the cases of
no or just “transient” excessive deficit. Budgetary problems would have been
overcome within one year after the end of the recession in only about one third of the
cases (7 out of 24). In 11 out of 24 cases, the deficit would have been back below the
3% limit within two years after the end of the recession. Moreover, the number of
cases with longer-than-acceptable retrenchment periods increases significantly (to 13,
in 8 of these cases the adjustment period took at least 5 years).
The above analysis confirms the policy conclusions of Section 5: an initially sound
budgetary position - a balanced budget - allows to fend off the threat of sanctions in the
majority of events and in only a relatively small numberof cases should substantially
faster adjustment strategies have been implemented. The situation thus becomes
problematic the further away the government budget moves from a balanced position. In
such cases, with the budgetary strategies implemented in the past, not only a large
number of countries would have run into excessive deficits, but, in view of the longer
adjustment period needed to bring the deficit back under the 3% threshold, many
Member States would have incurred the fines foreseen by the Stability and Growth Pact.
7DEOH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GHILFLWEHIRUHUHFHVVLRQGW￿￿ 
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 $VXPPLQJXS
The aim of this paper was to examine whether EU Member States will have to change
their budgetary policy behaviour once the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability
and Growth Pact become fully operational during the third stage of EMU. Indeed, these
procedures will introduce a major “regime-change” as Member States will be bound to
apply prudent budgetary policies in order to avoid an excessive deficit position.
The paper first examined Member States’ budgetary performances during phases of
economic slowdown over the period 1961-1996. A simulation exercise was then set up
whereby the provisions of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth
Pact were applied “retrospectively”. More specifically, the paper analysed whether,
during and immediately after these recession periods, Member States would have moved
in a situation of excessive deficit had past budgetary policies been pursued.
0DLQUHVXOWV
Some results of the paper confirm outcomes which were to be expected a priori, while
others are not obvious and deserve further attention:
%XGJHWDU\SROLFLHVLQUHFHVVLRQVGXULQJWKHSHULRG
-  There has been no systematic tendency to loosen budgetary policy during recessions:
while the Nordic countries pursued active counter-cyclical budgetary policies during
their multi-year recession episodes, most other EU Member States often carried out a
fiscal retrenchment policy during periods of economic slowdown.
-  The initial public finance conditions influence the way budgetary policies react to
cyclical downturns: countries with low deficit and debt levels were able to exploit the
available room for manoeuvre by carrying out counter-cyclical budgetary policies; on
the contrary, Member States with higher budgetary imbalances were less able to
smooth out the cycle through fiscal policies and even had to implement pro-cyclical
retrenchment policies during recessions in order to prevent their budget deficits from
getting out of hand.
-  The build-up in government debt that occurred in many EU Member States over the
past decades did not take place during periods of economic slowdown, but rather,
resulted from public finance imbalances in non-recession periods.
- The main discretionary instrument to smooth out the effects of cyclical downturns is
government expenditure. Contrary to widespread perception, discretionary tax
revenue has risen during recessions, thereby partly or totally offsetting the rise in
expenditure.
³5HWURVSHFWLYH´DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH6WDELOLW\DQG*URZWK3DFW
-  The simultaneous application of the “exceptionality”, “temporariness” and
“closeness” conditions in the case of severe recessions “over-determines” the decision
on whether or not an excessive deficit exists: the relaxation of one of these conditions
does not produce significantly different results as long as the other two conditions are
sufficiently strict. For example, a relaxation of the “closeness” condition would not
produce a significantly larger number of cases which would escape being put into
excessive deficit, as the “exceptionality” and “temporariness” conditions are already
sufficiently binding.29
-  Over the past 36 years, an initially balanced budget would have prevented all one-year
recessions from leading to a budget deficit above 3% of GDP in the year following
the recession (hence the excessive deficit would have been, at most, “transient”).
However, the early years of EMU, when some countries might still have a deficit of
about 2% of GDP, are likely to prove highly problematic in the event of a severe
recession.
-  The risk of incurring an excessive deficit is high in case of protracted recessions, even
if the starting point is a sound budgetary position. The same conclusions can be
drawn for exceptionally severe recessions with negative growth of 2% or more.
However, there are no economic downturns other than “severe recessions” which
would produce serious budgetary effects if the budget is initially in balance. Mild
recessions are not likely to create excessive deficits once the medium-term target of
“close to balance or in surplus” is met. The same conclusions hold in the case of an
abrupt slowdown in growth. As such, the 0.75% recession threshold therefore appears
appropriate once the medium-term target of “close to balance or in surplus” is
reached.
-  If Member States start off with a balanced budget, then even in the event of breaching
the 3% ceiling during the recession year, a fast budgetary adjustment to fend off the
threat of sanctions is feasible. However, the situation becomes more problematic the
further away government budgets move from a balanced position. In such cases, the
budgetary strategies implemented in the past would have implied longer-than-
acceptable retrenchment periods. This calls for a fast convergence towards a “safer”
budgetary position.
0DMRUSROLF\LPSOLFDWLRQV
The results of the paper suggest that there is no need for EU Member States to
substantially change budgetary policies carried out during recessions. Indeed, over the
past decades, these policies were generally rather prudent. However, the paper points to
the need for substantial changes in budgetary behaviour in post-recession periods.
More specifically, the paper allows the following policy conclusions to be drawn:
1) A medium-term balanced budget is highly recommendable for most Member States in
order to meet the Stability and Growth Pact requirements. It would allow them to
overcome single-year severe recessions without incurring excessive deficits and also
allow them to bring the deficit swiftly back under the 3% ceiling in the case of longer
cyclical downturns.
2) In case of recessions, the margins for implementing large-scale discretionary counter-
cyclical policies are rather limited, unless budgets move into surplus.
3) The 0.75% recession benchmark covers almost all recessions which would pose a
serious threat to budgetary stability, if the starting point is a balanced budget.
The paper identifies two major risks:
a) In the event of a severe recession during the early years of EMU, since several
countries will still have deficits in the 2% to 3% of GDP range, they risk moving into
excessive deficit, unless they take a pro-cyclical budgetary stance.
b) Long recessions may pose serious threats even to countries with sound pre-recession
budgetary positions.
These risks would need to be taken into account in the implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact.30
 &RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
The application of the provisions of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability
and Growth Pact to the past is obviously a highly speculative exercise. Its results do not
address the following questions: to what extent is past budgetary behaviour a reliable
guide to assess the likely behaviour of national budgetary policies in EMU during
recessions? More specifically, would Member States need larger or smaller changes in
their budgetary positions to provide the degree of stabilisation which occurred in the
past?
A number of factors will play an important role:
1HZSROLF\UHJLPHXQGHU(08
During the third phase of EMU, the conduct of monetary policy will be centralised at the
European level and will therefore no longer be available as a policy tool at the national
level. Budgetary policy will thus be the main macroeconomic policy instrument still
available for individual Member States to combat recessions, especially when shocks are
asymmetric. The impossibility of lowering interest rates and resorting to currency
devaluations might require larger deficit changes.
On the other hand, according to the Mundell-Fleming framework, budgetary policy will
in principle become more effective in dampening the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations
in the new policy environment of EMU with centralised monetary policy and irrevocably
fixed exchange rates between Member States.
If, however, EMU enhances the process of economic integration, trade leakages of
budgetary policies will gradually increase, thereby reducing the “domestic” effectiveness
of budgetary policies. Unless national policies are co-ordinated, this factor raises the
changes in the budget deficit required in order to attain the same degree of stabilisation
achieved in the past.
³3UHUHFHVVLRQ´GHILFLWOHYHO
Actual deficit changes observed during past recessions were applied in our retrospective
exercise to “pre-recession” deficit levels chosen specifically for the exercise (0% and 2%
of GDP). However, the actual deficit changes which took place during past severe
recessions usually started from markedly higher pre-recession deficit levels. The impact
on the economy of budgetary policy changes during recessions also varies depending on
the deficit and debt levels. For instance, the markets’ perception of an increase in the
deficit from 0% to 2% of GDP during a severe recession will be different from that of a
rise in the deficit from, say, 8% to 10% of GDP, the latter more likely being interpreted
as shifting the deficit to an unsustainable path. This may lead to an increase in the risk
premium on interest rates which reduces the effectiveness of the fiscal expansion.
High budgetary imbalances may inhibit policy makers from using the budgetary
instrument for stabilisation purposes. Indeed, the higher risk premiums which would
raise the interest burden may represent a powerful disincentive to expanding fiscal policy
in spite of the recession. As was pointed out in Section 4, budgetary reactions to
economic downturns differ depending on the initial public finance conditions before the
recession: countries with high deficit and debt levels tend to conduct tighter fiscal
policies during recessions than those with lower deficit and debt levels. In the future,
when medium-term targets have been achieved, Member States would have more room
for manoeuvre to undertake accommodating policies.31
These factors point in different directions. As a consequence, the net effect on the
requirement for budgetary stabilisation is ambiguous. If it proved necessary to reinforce
the working of the automatic stabilisers during recessions in EMU, larger swings in
budget deficits compared to the past would have to be allowed for. Under the provisions
of the Stability and Growth Pact, this would imply, however, that during the third phase
of EMU, Member States, and especially those with large automatic stabilisers, would
have to run budgetary surpluses when in medium-term equilibrium.
The present paper far from exhausts the issue of what can be learnt from the past
budgetary behaviour for the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and, more
generally, how budgetary authorities actually behaved in different economic
circumstances.
The following areas were not or were only partially covered, and therefore, provide
scope for further research:
- %XGJHWDU\SROLFLHVRYHUWKHIXOOF\FOH this paper has focused essentially on recession
episodes. The exercise could therefore be extended to other cyclical phases besides the
recession. Indeed, as already indicated in this paper, the problem in the past has not
been so much that Member States let budget deficits get out of hand too much during
recessions but that they did not seize the opportunity presented by post-recession
economic recovery to immediately correct their budgetary position.
- &RPSRVLWLRQRIEXGJHWDU\SROLFLHV the paper addressed the issue of the composition of
budgetary policy reactions to recessions via a preliminary analysis of the overall
revenue and expenditure components. Two extensions can be envisaged: first, an
analysis of the composition of retrenchment policies over the years following the
recession to assess, for instance, whether the length of the adjustment depends on the
composition of budgetary consolidation; second, a further disaggregation of the overall
components into more detailed government revenue and expenditure categories is
necessary. This detailed analysis would allow conclusions to be drawn on the
mechanisms causing budgetary policies to become unsustainable, as well as on the
possible effectiveness and durability of budgetary consolidation efforts.32
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Cumulative change (t-1) to (t)**
case no t
Member 
State
deficit(t-1) 
relative to 
the EU 
avg.(t-1)*
debt(t-1) 
relative to 
the EU 
avg.(t-1) GDP
 output 
gap
actual 
budget 
deficit
of which: 
structural 
deficit
of which:    
structural 
revenue
structural 
expenditure
actual 
primary 
budget 
deficit
of which: 
primary 
structural 
deficit
of which: 
primary 
structural 
expenditure debt
1 1974-75 DK -1,6 -6,2 6,7 2,7 1,8 4,6 6,6 2,7 4,6 -1,9
1974 DK lower lower -0,9 -3,4 2,1 0,1 3,0 3,1 2,1 0,1 3,1 -2,7
1975 DK lower lower -0,7 -2,9 4,5 2,6 -1,1 1,5 4,5 2,6 1,5 0,8
2 1 9 7 4E L n . a .n . a .- 3 , 6- 8 , 8n . a .n . a .n . a .n . a .n . a .n . a .n . a .n . a .
3 1974-75 UK -1,5 -5,5 1,2 -1,4 6,5 5,1 0,9 -1,7 4,7 -3,6
1974 UK higher higher -1,4 -3,5 0,3 -0,9 4,6 3,7 -0,3 -1,5 3,2 0,2
1975 UK higher higher -0,1 -2,0 0,9 -0,5 1,8 1,3 1,2 -0,2 1,5 -3,8
4 1975 B higher higher -1,5 -4,7 2,2 -0,3 5,4 5,1 2,1 -0,4 4,9 1,8
5 1975 D lower lower -1,3 -3,9 4,3 2,3 1,6 3,9 4,1 2,1 3,7 5,4
6 1975 I higher higher -2,1 -6,3 4,2 2,2 1,8 3,9 3,4 1,4 3,1 6,1
7 1975 L lower lower -6,6 -9,6 3,8 -0,8 10,8 9,9 3,7 0,3 10,1 1,3
8 1975 P lower lower -4,3 -8,7 2,3 -0,6 4,5 4,2 2,1 -0,8 4,0 7,2
annual average 1-8 - 2 , 3 - 5 , 42 , 70 , 53 , 64 , 12 , 50 , 43 , 91 , 8
episode average 1-8 - 2 , 8 - 6 , 73 , 50 , 64 , 65 , 23 , 30 , 55 , 02 , 3
9 1977 S lower lower -1,6 -3,4 2,8 -0,1 5,1 5,1 2,5 -0,4 4,7 2,4
10 1980-81 DK -1,3 -5,1 5,3 1,9 3,9 5,8 3,4 0,1 3,9 21,0
1980 DK lower lower -0,4 -2,4 1,6 0,3 2,5 2,8 1,1 -0,2 2,3 7,5
1981 DK close higher -0,9 -2,8 3,6 1,6 1,3 3,0 2,3 0,3 1,6 12,6
11 1980-81 UK -2,9 -6,3 0,7 -3,0 6,9 3,7 0,1 -3,7 3,1 -0,4
1980 UK higher higher -1,6 -3,4 0,2 -1,4 3,0 1,7 -0,1 -1,7 1,4 -0,6
1981 UK higher higher -1,3 -3,0 0,5 -1,7 3,7 2,1 0,2 -2,0 1,7 0,2
12 1981 B higher higher -1,6 -2,8 4,1 2,1 2,7 4,8 2,4 0,3 2,9 14,2
13 1981-82 NL -1,7 -4,8 2,4 -1,4 4,3 2,9 0,9 -2,9 1,4 9,8
1981 NL higher higher -0,5 -2,1 1,2 -0,5 1,8 1,3 0,4 -1,2 0,6 4,0
1982 NL higher higher -1,2 -2,7 1,2 -1,0 2,5 1,5 0,5 -1,7 0,8 5,6
14 1982 D lower lower -0,9 -2,7 -0,4 -1,8 1,9 0,1 -0,9 -2,3 -0,3 3,3
annual average 10-14 -1,1 -2,7 1,5 -0,3 2,4 2,1 0,7 -1,1 1,4 5,9
episode average 10-14 -1,7 -4,3 2,4 -0,4 3,9 3,5 1,2 -1,7 2,2 9,6
15 1983-84 P -2,1 -6,9 -0,6 -3,6 4,2 0,4 -3,0 -6,1 -2,3 10,5
1983 P higher lower -0,2 -2,7 2,1 1,0 3,2 4,3 1,5 0,3 3,6 5,1
1984 P higher higher -1,9 -4,3 -2,6 -4,6 1,0 -3,8 -4,5 -6,4 -5,9 5,1
16 1991-93 FIN -11,5 -15,1 13,9 3,5 9,3 13,0 10,2 0,2 9,4 48,9
1991 FIN lower lower -7,1 -8,6 6,9 1,5 5,8 7,3 6,4 1,0 6,8 8,5
1992 FIN lower lower -3,6 -4,4 4,4 1,3 3,2 4,5 3,6 0,5 3,9 18,5
1993 FIN close lower -1,2 -2,1 2,1 0,7 0,1 0,7 0,2 -1,3 -1,3 15,8
17 1991-93 S -4,6 -7,5 17,4 9,9 0,7 10,6 15,3 8,4 9,1 36,1
1991 S lower lower -1,1 -2,2 5,3 3,4 -1,8 1,6 5,2 3,3 1,5 9,5
1992 S lower lower -1,4 -2,4 6,7 4,4 1,0 5,4 6,4 4,2 5,1 14,1
1993 S higher higher -2,2 -3,1 4,5 1,7 1,5 3,2 3,7 0,9 2,5 8,9
18 1991-92 UK -2,5 -6,3 4,8 0,7 1,3 2,0 5,3 1,2 2,4 6,6
1991 UK lower lower -2,0 -4,0 1,1 -1,2 1,1 0,0 1,6 -0,7 0,4 0,4
1992 UK lower lower -0,5 -2,4 3,7 1,9 0,2 2,0 3,7 1,9 2,0 6,2
19 1993 B higher higher -1,4 -3,5 0,3 -1,7 2,4 0,7 0,3 -1,7 0,7 6,4
20 1993 D lower lower -1,2 -3,6 0,7 -0,9 1,8 0,8 0,6 -1,1 0,8 4,1
21 1993 EL higher higher -1,0 -2,5 1,9 0,8 1,5 2,2 0,8 0,2 1,3 12,6
22 1993 E lower lower -1,2 -3,5 3,2 0,9 1,8 2,7 2,2 -0,1 1,7 12,1
23 1993 F lower lower -1,3 -3,2 1,8 0,3 2,0 2,3 1,7 0,1 2,1 6,0
24 1993 I higher higher -1,2 -2,9 0,1 -1,3 4,0 2,8 -0,6 -1,9 2,1 10,8
25 1993 P lower higher -1,2 -3,5 3,7 1,5 -1,4 0,7 4,2 3,1 2,0 4,9
annual average 16-25 - 1 , 8 - 3 , 53 , 10 , 91 , 62 , 52 , 70 , 62 , 19 , 3
episode average 16-25 -2,7 -5,1 4,8 1,4 2,3 3,8 4,0 0,8 3,2 14,8
annual average 1-25 -1,7 -3,8 2,4 0,3 2,4 2,8 2,0 -0,1 2,3 6,1
episode average 1-25 -2,5 -5,5 3,6 0,5 3,5 4,1 2,8 -0,1 3,3 9,4
t-1: pre-recession year
t: recession period
n.a. = not available
KLJKHU than the EU avg. deficit : above EU avg.+1%
ORZHU than the EU avg. deficit : below EU avg.-1%$QQH[
7DEOH %XGJHWDU\LQGLFDWRUVIRUWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ0HPEHU6WDWHV￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$YHUDJH
JRYHUQPHQW
6WDQGDUG￿GHYLDWLRQ
JRYHUQPHQW
)UHTXHQF\￿RI￿EXGJHW￿GHILFLWV
DERYH
0HPEHU EXGJHW￿GHILFLW EXGJHW￿GHILFLWV ￿￿￿RI￿*’3
6WDWHV ￿￿￿RI￿*’3￿ ￿￿￿SRLQWV￿RI￿*’3￿ number of years* %
% 5.5 3.1 26 72%
'. 0.5 3.3 7 19%
' 1.5 1.8 8 22%
(/ 9.7 3.8 16 89%
( 3.1 2.5 15 56%
) 1.4 1.9 6 16%
,5/ 5.9 3.8 27 75%
, 7.3 3.7 29 81%
/ -2.0 2.0 13 %
1/ 2.7 2.0 15 42%
$ 1.6 2.2 9 25%
3 3.2 3.3 20 57%
),1 -2.1 3.6 5 14%
6 1.1 5.3 10 37%
8. 2.6 2.3 16 44%
(8    
*On a total of 36 years (1961-1996), except for the following cases: 18 years (1979-1996) for
Greece, 27 years for Spain, Sweden and EU (1970-1996), 34 years for Luxembourg (excl. 1988
and 1989) and 35 years for Portugal (excl. 1980).
Source: European Commission,
*RYHUQPHQWEXGJHWEDODQFHVLQWKH(8
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Note: Deficit with + sign, surplus with - sign.
-”Core”: B, D, F, L, NL, A
- Scand+: DK, FIN, S + IRL, UK
- Mediterra.: EL, E, I, P$11(; )HDWXUHVRIPLOGUHFHVVLRQV(decrease of GDP by less than 0.75%)
Cumulative change (t-1) to (t)**
case no t
Member 
State
deficit(t-1) 
relative to 
the EU 
avg.(t-1)*
debt(t-1) 
relative to 
the EU 
avg.(t-1) GDP
 output 
gap
actual 
budget 
deficit
of which: 
structural 
deficit
of which:    
structural 
revenue
structural 
expenditure
actual 
primary 
budget 
deficit
of which: 
primary 
structural 
deficit
of which: 
primary 
structural 
expenditure debt
1 1967 D n.a. n.a. -0,3 -4,3 1,2 -0,8 2,3 1,5 1,1 -0,9 1,3 n.a.
0
2 1975 F lower n.a. -0,3 -3,6 2,7 1,2 3,0 4,2 2,3 0,8 3,8 n.a.
3 1975 A lower lower -0,4 -3,9 3,8 1,9 1,9 3,8 3,5 1,7 3,6 6,3
avg. 2-3 -0,4 -3,8 3,3 1,6 2,4 4,0 2,9 1,3 3,7 6,3
4 1976 FIN lower lower -0,4 -3,7 -2,6 -4,8 5,3 0,5 -2,6 -4,8 0,5 -0,4
5 1981 E lower lower -0,2 -2,0 1,3 0,3 2,0 2,3 1,2 0,2 2,2 3,9
6 1981 L lower lower -0,6 -2,8 2,7 0,9 2,0 2,8 2,8 1,3 3 0,5
7 1981 A lower lower -0,3 -2,4 0,1 -1,0 2,4 1,4 -0,2 -1,3 1,1 2,0
avg. 5-7 -0,4 -2,4 1,4 0,0 2,1 2,2 1,3 0,1 2,1 2,1
8 1983 IRL higher higher -0,2 -3,3 -2,0 -3,8 3,0 -0,8 -2,2 -4,1 -1,1 9,9
9 1987 EL higher lower -0,5 -2,1 -0,7 -1,4 1,2 -0,2 -1,8 -2,6 -1,4 6,0
avg. 1-9 -0,4 -3,1 0,7 -0,8 2,6 1,7 0,5 -1,1 1,4 4,0
t-1: pre-recession year
t: recession period
n.a. = not available
KLJKHU than the EU avg. deficit : above EU avg.+1%
ORZHU than the EU avg. deficit : below EU avg.-1%
** changes expressed as % of GDP; for output gap : % of trend GDP
6RXUFH￿￿￿(XURSHDQ￿&RPPLVVLRQ￿￿’*￿,,￿GDWDEDVH$11(; )HDWXUHVRIDEUXSWVORZGRZQLQJURZWK
￿SRVLWLYH￿UHDO￿JURZWK￿UDWHV￿EXW￿ZRUVHQLQJ￿RI￿RXWSXW￿JDS￿E\￿DW￿OHDVW￿￿￿￿￿￿SRLQWV￿RI￿WUHQG￿*’3￿
Cumulative change (t-1) to (t)**
case no t
Member 
State
deficit(t-1) 
relative to 
the EU 
avg.(t-1)*
debt(t-1) 
relative to 
the EU 
avg.(t-1) GDP
 output 
gap
actual 
budget 
deficit
of which: 
structural 
deficit
of which: 
structural 
revenue
structural 
expenditure
actual 
primary 
budget 
deficit
of which: 
primary 
structural 
deficit
of which: 
primary 
structural 
expenditure debt
1 1962 EL n.a. n.a. 1,5 -5,9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 1963 DK n.a. n.a. 0,6 -3,8 -1,2 n.a. n.a. -0,3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
3 1964 I n.a. n.a. 2,8 -2,5 0,3 n.a. n.a. 0,4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
4 1966 IRL higher n.a. 0,9 -3,1 -1,4 n.a. n.a. 0,1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
5 1966 P lower n.a. 3,9 -4,1 -0,2 -0,4 0,6 0,1 -0,2 -1,0 -0,1 n.a.
6 1967 L lower n.a. 0,2 -3,3 2,2 n.a. n.a. 2,0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
7 1969 P lower n.a. 3,4 -4,5 -0,8 -1,1 0,9 -0,2 -0,8 -1,7 -0,2 n.a.
8 1971 I higher lower 1,9 -2,5 1,5 0,6 1,2 1,8 1,3 0,4 1,5 4,9
9 1974 D lower lower 0,2 -2,7 2,5 1,1 1,7 2,7 2,4 1 2,6 1,1
10 1974 P lower lower 1,1 -5,9 2,6 1,5 0,8 2,5 2,7 1,6 2,5 -0,3
11 1975 E lower lower 0,5 -3,1 0,1 -1,1 2,3 1,3 0,2 -1,1 1,3 0,3
12 1975 NL lower n.a. 0,2 -2,9 2,6 0,5 3,6 4,1 2,5 0,4 4 0,2
13 1976 IRL higher lower 1,3 -3,0 -3,8 -5,4 4,5 -0,8 -4,4 -6 -1,5 4,8
avg. 2-13 1,4 -3,6 0,4 -0,5 2,0 1,1 0,5 -0,8 1,3 1,8
14 1977 FIN lower lower 0,2 -2,8 1,6 -0,2 1,6 1,4 1,5 -0,3 1,3 1,7
15 1978 A lower lower 0,1 -2,7 0,4 -0,8 3,6 2,8 0,1 -1,1 2,4 3,8
avg. 14-15 0,2 -2,8 1,0 -0,5 2,6 2,1 0,8 -0,7 1,9 2,8
16 1986 IRL higher higher 0,3 -3,1 -0,1 -1,9 1,4 -0,5 0,4 -1,4 0 11,4
17 1991 IRL lower higher 2,6 -2,5 0,1 -1,2 1,4 0,2 0,3 -1 0,4 -0,2
18 1993 L lower lower 0,0 -3,0 -0,9 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0,9 n.a. n.a. 1,0
avg. 16-18 1,0 -2,9 -0,3 -1,6 1,4 -0,2 -0,1 -1,2 0,2 4,1
avg. 2-18 1,2 -3,4 0,3 -0,7 2,0 1,1 0,4 -0,9 1,2 2,6
t: recession year
n.a. = not available
KLJKHU than the EU avg. deficit : above EU avg.+1%
ORZHU than the EU avg. deficit : below EU avg.-1%
** changes expressed as % of GDP; for output gap : % of trend GDP
6RXUFH￿￿￿(XURSHDQ￿&RPPLVVLRQ￿￿’*￿,,￿GDWDEDVH